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I. INTRODUCTION
If the law of takings as applied to real and personal property is the
"muddle" that many commentators insist it is,' the law of takings with
regard to intellectualproperty can only be characterized as a muddle within
the muddle. To illustrate, consider the following three scenarios, all of
them based upon real cases, and decide for yourself whether you think the
United States government has effected a taking of private property for
public use, for which just compensation is due under the Fifth

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. I thank Christina
Bohannan, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Mark Lemley, and James Nicholas for their comments and

criticism. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. References to takings law as a "muddle" have become commonplace. See, e.g., Mark
Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through?Takings JurisprudenceMeets the EndangeredSpecies Act,
38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825 (1997); Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the
Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV. 329 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
529
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Amendment:2
1. The United States Marine Corps purchases equipment that, without
your knowledge or consent, incorporates your patented invention, and
begins using that equipment for military purposes.
2. In accordance with a procedure set forth in a federal statute, you
submit to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) trade secret data3
relating to your pesticide products, in connection with your application to
register these products for manufacture and sale in the United States.
Congress subsequently amends the statute to permit the EPA to disclose
this information to the public under certain circumstances, and to use it in
evaluating the safety and efficacy of other manufacturers' products or
services.
3. The federal government, in a nationwide advertising campaign to
promote tourism in federal parks, uses a slogan that you believe threatens
to infringe or dilute a slogan that you have been using as a trademark to
identify your products.4
Readers familiar with government claims law will recognize the first
scenario as one that arises with some frequency; they also may be excused
for asking why it matters whether the government use constitutes a taking,
in light of the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) authorizes a patentee under
circumstances like those described above to file suit against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for "reasonable and
entire compensation." 5 Nevertheless, characterizing the use as a taking can
have practical consequences, as one recent case decided by that court
indicates.
In De Graffenriedv. UnitedStates,6 the plaintiff sought compensation
under section 1498(a) for the government's unauthorized use of his patent,
and an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA).7 In opposing the request for fees, the government argued that
section 1498(a) actions are eminent domain proceedings, and that the
EAJA authorizes an award of attorney's fees in eminent domain
proceedings only under certain limited circumstances not present in the
case.' Notwithstanding a series of cases dating from 1881 to the present
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. For a discussion of trade secret law, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of trademark infringement and dilution, see infra notes 39-46 and
accompanying text.
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994).
6. 29 Fed. Cl. 384 (1993).
7. See id. at 385 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994)).
8. See id. at 386. Specifically, the EAJA authorizes the court to award attorney's fees to a
"prevailing party" in a suit against the United States under certain circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(b) (1994). In the case of eminent domain proceedings, however, the statute defines
"prevailing party" as
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day in which the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and the Court of
Federal Claims itself have described the federal government's use of
patented inventions as an exercise of the federal eminent domain power,9
the court concluded that these descriptions are dictum and that federal uses
of patents are not takings of private property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment." The court nevertheless relied on an alternative ground in
denying the plaintiffs fee request."
Readers familiar with takings law itself will easily recognize the second
scenario as based upon Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,' 2 a 1984 case in
which the United States Supreme Court applied its regulatory takings
framework 3 to conclude that some, but not all, uses and disclosures of
trade secret information in accordance with a federal regulatory scheme
potentially implicate the Fifth Amendment. 4 As discussed below,
however, if Monsantostands for the proposition that the regulatory takings
framework applies to all or most government uses of intellectual property,
then probably very few such uses qualify as takings, again notwithstanding
contrary line of cases describing them in precisely this
the ostensibly
15
manner.
To my knowledge, the third scenario has not yet occurred in a case
involving the federal government, although a recent decision involving the
State of Utah's use of the slogan GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH
involves similar facts.' 6 Under current law, the proper resolution of a case
of this nature against the federal government remains unclear. Although the
Federal Tort Claims Act 17 permits trademark owners to file claims against

a party who obtains a final judgment... the amount of which is at least as close to
the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of
the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is
attested to at trial on behalf of the Government.
Id. § 2412(d)(2)(H). In De Graffenried,the plaintiff did not qualify as a prevailing party under this
definition because the compensation the court awarded him was much closer to the valuation
provided by the government's expert than it was to that provided by the plaintiffs expert. Thus, if
the proceeding was an eminent domain proceeding, the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees
under the EAJA. See 29 Fed. Cl. at 386.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See De Graffenried,29 Fed. CI. at 386-89.
11. See id. at 389-92.
12. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
13. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 130-68 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
16. See Ringling Bros.-Bamum &Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997). The opinion does not, however, discuss the issue of whether the
government's use of a trademarked slogan may constitute a taking.
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

the United States for the violation of state trademark law, 8 no federal
statute explicitly authorizes suits against the United States for violations
of federal trademark law 9 such as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.20
As discussed below, however, if the federal government's dilution of a
trademark can be characterized as a taking of private property for public
use, the owner may be able to obtain compensation from the government
under the Tucker Act,2 ' although valuing the proper compensation for
dilution of the mark will be difficult.22
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the issue of whether uses of
intellectual property by the federal23 government without the consent of the
owner constitute takings of private property for public use, for which just
compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment, has evoked wildly
differing responses, ranging from the view that virtually all government
uses of intellectual property constitute takings to the view that virtually
none of them do.24 In this Article, I attempt to reconcile the various strands
of intellectual property takings law on this topic into a coherent whole. Part
II provides some background information on intellectual property and on
general takings principles. Part III examines three competing perspectives,
which I refer to as the Expansive, Middle, and Narrow Views, on the issue
of whether federal uses of intellectual property implicate the Fifth
Amendment, and then assesses the merits of these competing views. Part
IV considers some additional complications arising from the fact that the
Fifth Amendment applies only to (1) governmentally-authorized, (2) public
uses (3) of private property. I conclude that, on balance, most federal uses
of patents and copyrights probably do implicate the Takings Clause, but

18. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:63, at 25-102 (1997).
19. See id. at 25-102 to -103. But see Federal Express Corp. v. United States Postal Serv.,
151 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress has waived U.S. Postal Service's
immunity from suit for violation of Lanham Act); Global Mail Ltd. v. United States Postal Serv.,
142 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Q Int'l Courier, Inc., 131 F. 3d 770,
774-75 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).
20. 15 U.S.C.A. § 43(c) (West Supp. 1997).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
22. See infranote 43.
23. The parallel issue of whether uses by state governments effect takings of private property
for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation presents two additional complications
not relevant to the present discussion: first, whether federal law preempts the states from exercising
their eminent domain power over federal intellectual property rights and, second, if not, whether
a plaintiff must file her intellectual property takings claim against the state in state court before
proceeding with a federal action. A coauthor and I present a detailed discussion of these issues in
Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation ofState
Sovereign hnmunityfrom FederalInfringementClaims Constitutionalin Light ofSeminole Tribe?,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
24. See infra notes 71-183 and accompanying text.
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that noninfringing uses of trademarks and some other forms of unfair
competition probably do not. As a result, the federal government appears
to remain at least partially immune from liability for some violations of
federal unfair competition law.
I. BACKGROUND

In this Part, I provide a very brief overview of the various types of
intellectual property rights that may be subject to use by the federal
government, and how these rights differ from one another.' I then present
background information concerning general principles of takings law.
A. IntellectualProperty
Although the law of intellectual property can be divided in various
ways, for purposes of the present discussion I shall concentrate first upon
the law of patents and trade secrets, which provide exclusive rights in
certain types of inventions and other useful information. To qualify for
patent protection, an invention must be novel, useful, and nonobvious,26
and the patent application must disclose certain specified information that
would enable others to make and use the invention.27 Once granted, a
patent confers upon the patentee the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented invention in the United States for a term
ending twenty years from the date on which the patent application was
filed.28 A trade secret, by contrast, can be any type of information that
provides one with a competitive advantage as long as it remains secret.29
The owner of a trade secret may exclude others from, among other things,
acquiring the secret by "improper means" such as theft or espionage, or
25. For a more detailed overview of intellectual property law, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas
F. Cotter, An EconomicAnalysisof DamagesRules in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 39 WM. &MARY
L. REV. 1585, 1592-617 (1998).
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1997).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (1994); 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1997).
29. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, for example, which has been adopted in a majority
of states,
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that . . . derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertained by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and... is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), reprintedin 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED: CIVIL PROCEDURAL
AND REMEDIAL LAWS 438 (master ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
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from using or disclosing the secret if the other knew (or had reason to
know) at the time of disclosure or use that she had acquired it under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain secrecy. 30 Unlike the
patentee, however, the trade secret owner cannot enjoin the manufacture,
sale, or use of her invention by one who has independently invented it or
who has discovered it through reverse engineering.31
A third form of intellectual property protection, copyright, subsists in
works of authorship---things such as literary works, musical compositions,
paintings, sculptures, photographs, and movies-that are original and are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 32 For a term consisting of the life
of the author plus fifty years,33 the owner of a copyright enjoys the five
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and public
performance and display,34 subject to defenses such as fair use.35 In
addition, the statute confers upon the author of "works of visual art"
(defined as the original and certain limited edition copies of paintings,
drawings, sculptures, and photographic images, subject to various
exceptions) 36 the so-called "moral rights" of claiming authorship of the
work37 and, under some circumstances, preventing the distortion,
mutilation, or other modification or destruction of the work.38
Finally, under the law of trademarks and unfair competition, the owner
of a trademark-essentially, any word or other symbol that identifies a
unique source of a product or service 3 9 -may exclude others from using
the same or a confusingly similar mark for the same or a related product or
service, within the area in which the mark is enforceable. 0 A recent
amendment to the federal Lanham Acte4 ' also provides a remedy for
trademark "dilution," which occurs when another's use of the same or a
similar mark on a different product or service threatens either to "blur" the
mark's distinctive nature or to "tarnish" it "through inherently negative or
30. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(I), (ii); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 (1995) (similar).
31.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.

32. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
33. See id. § 302(a).
34. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1997).
35. See id. § 107 (providing limited defense for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, in light of various specified factors); see also id. §§
108-121 (setting forth additional limitations on exclusive rights).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work of visual art").
37. See id. §§ 106A(a)(1), 106A(a)(2).
38. See id. §§ 106A(a)(3), 113(d).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFUNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.
40. See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 16:1; Blair & Cotter, supra note 25, at
1608. Trademarks are governed by the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1128 (West
1998), as well as by state law. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 25, at 1609.
41. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1128 (West 1998).
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unsavory associations, or with goods or services that produce a negative
response... ."42 Antidilution protection under the Lanham Act, however,
is provided only to "famous" marks.43 Finally, the Lanham Act creates a
federal cause of action for, among other things, the common-law unfair
competition torts of false advertising and product disparagement.' A
defendant engages in false advertising when he makes a materially false
representation concerning his own goods or services,45 whereas he commits
product disparagement when the materially false representation concerns
a competitor's goods or services.46
B. General Takings Principles
The governing standards in the ensuing discussion derive of course
from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides in relevant part that private property may not "be taken for public
use, without just compensation."'4 7 More precisely, the amendment
obligates the federal government48 to pay a property owner just
compensation whenever a state actor, (1) duly authorized by law,49 (2)
effects a taking,50 (3) of private property,5 (4) for a public use.52 This Part

42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c.
43. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998) (setting forth factors to be considered in
determining whether mark is sufficiently famous to merit protection against dilution); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFUNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e ("As a general matter, a trademark is
sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use ifthe mark retains its source significance
when encountered outside the context of the goods or services with which the mark is used by the
trademark owner.").
Another limitation imposed by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act is that, in general, the
plaintiff is entitled only to injunctive relief; the court may award damages only in cases of willful
dilution. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 43(c)(1), (2) (West 1998). The reason for this restriction is not entirely
clear, but may reflect in part the belief that accurately assessing the damages attributable to an act
of dilution may be next to impossible. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 25, at 1692-93.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994); see also 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY &GEORGEF.
LONG, III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT § 43(a), § 6:01, at 6-1 to 6-2 (1997); 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 27:24.
45. See RESTATEMENT (HIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.
46. See id. § 2 cmt. C.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. The Fifth Amendment also is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and is therefore applicable against the states. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 383-84 (1994). As noted above, however, this Article focuses exclusively upon uses of
intellectual property by the federal, rather than state, government.
49. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Hooe v. United States,
218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910).
50. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing what types of conduct constitute
takings).
51. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1000-04.
52. See id. at 1000-01, 1014-16.
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provides some background information concerning what is often the most
difficult issue in a takings case, namely, whether the type of conduct in
which the government has engaged can be characterized as a taking
(element two above). Consideration of the other elements listed above is
taken up in the following Part.
By far the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions concerning takings
have arisen in response to governmental actions involving real, as opposed
to personal or intangible, property. Although scholars have criticized the
Court for failing to provide a coherent rationale for the various strands of
its takings jurisprudence,53 a few fairly unambiguous propositions can be
drawn from the case law. One is that the physical occupation of one's
property (or a regulation authorizing a physical occupation) generally
constitutes a taking requiring the payment of just compensation,' even if
the occupation amounts only to the imposition of an easement or servitude
upon the land. 5 A second is that, in cases in which the state interferes with
the owner's use or enjoyment of her property but does not cause or
authorize a physical invasion, a court should consider several
factors-including "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action" 6 to determine whether the action constitutes a

53. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 125 (1993) (discussing
"the well-known paradox of takings jurisprudence" that, on the one hand, "owners may suffer large
pecuniary losses... without a court's finding a taking requiring compensation," while on the other
"if the court decides to characterize the government action as a physical occupation, a taking will
be found even if the loss or inconvenience to the owner is minuscule.").
54. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) ("In
general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation."); Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,522 (1992) ("Where the government authorizes a physical occupation
of property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation."); Loretto
v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp.,458 U.S. 419,426 (1982) (holding that astatute requiring
landlords to permit installation of cables and boxes for cable television effected taking); Kaiser
Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164,180 (1979) ("even if the Government physically invades only
an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation."); but see Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987) (suggesting that state may condition grant of
building permit on owner's agreement to provide public easement, without effecting taking or
imposing unconstitutional condition, if there is sufficient nexus between condition and legitimate
state interest, and condition does not deprive owner of all economically viable use); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) (requiring shopping mall owner to permit
plaintiffs to engage in political activity on mall premises did not constitute taking, despite fact that
plaintiffs "may have 'physically invaded' " owner's property, where there was no evidence of
impairment of value or use of property or that activity interfered with owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations).
55. See Teleprompter,458 U.S. at 426; KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
56. KaiserAetna,444 U.S. at 175 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 522-23 (stating that, when government regulates use

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/3

8

Cotter: Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Impliate the Fifth Amend
FEDERAL USES OF INTELLECTAL PROPERTY

taking. With regard to real property, however, a regulation that deprives the
owner of all use or value of her property virtually always constitutes a
taking,' even if the deprivation is only temporary. 58 A regulation that
deprives the owner of the most profitable use of a piece of personal
property, however, may not constitute a taking, if the other factors militate
against such a finding.59
The proper method for analyzing an alleged taking of intellectual
property is somewhat less clear. On the one hand, in Monsanto,' the only
recent United States Supreme Court case dealing with an alleged taking of
intellectual property (specifically, trade secrets), the Court applied the
multifactor analysis described above (relating to the character of the action,
its impact, and its effect upon expectations) to find that a federal statute
operated to effect a taking with respect to some, but not all, trade secret
information submitted to the government over the relevant period of time.61
By itself, therefore, Monsanto might seem to suggest that there is no
bright-line rule concerning government uses of intellectual property, and
that the issue of whether any given use constitutes a taking will be highly
of property, "compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation
or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the
regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the
public as a whole"); RADIN, supra note 53, at 124-25 & n.26 (stating that, under Penn Central,
"whether or not the government action can be characterized as a physical invasion is only one of
the significant factors to be weighed," and that others include (1) economic impact of regulation,
(2) whether regulation is an exercise of taxing power, (3) whether it promotes public health, safety,
morals, or welfare, (4) whether it is reasonably necessary to effectuate substantial public purpose,
and (5) whether it permits or facilitates uniquely public functions (quoting Penn Central,438 U.S.
at 122-23, 127-28)).
57. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (holding that state effects taking when "regulation denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land"); see also id. at 1027 ("[w]here the State
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with"); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTMrUTONAL LAW § 9-3, at 593 n.3 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that Court has
sustained "[u]ncompensated losses in excess of 75% of a property's value caused by regulation").
In practice, however, regulations that deprive an owner of literally alluses of her property may be
rare. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 902 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that ordinance temporarily prohibiting construction on subject
property did not deprive owner of all use of property), on remandfrom 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
58. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321-22 (1987) (holding that temporary deprivation of all use of property effects taking).
59. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (holding that regulations prohibiting
most profitable use (commercial sales) of parts of birds legally killed prior to effective date of
conservation statute did not effect taking, where owners retained right to possess, transport, display,
and give away property); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (discussing Andrus).
60. Monsanto,467 U.S. at 986.
61. See id. at 1005-16. I discuss this case in greater detail at infra notes 130-68 and
accompanying text.
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fact-specific. 62 On the other hand, in a series of decisions involving the Act
of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 6 3 -a federal statute that, among
other things, requires that patent owners be compensated when the federal
government uses or manufactures their patented inventions without
permission-the lower federal courts have characterized virtually all such
uses supported by sufficient legislative authorization as takings.' 4 The
language found in these opinions can in turn be traced back to a series of
Supreme Court decisions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, in which the Court on several occasions appeared to endorse this
view. 65 Whether these older cases can be reconciled with Monsanto, or
whether all uses of intellectual property must now be analyzed under the
multifactor approach, presents one of the more difficult issues in modem
takings jurisprudence.
III.

THREE COMPETING VIEWS

In this Part, I consider three competing views on the issue of whether
uses of intellectual property by the federal government constitute
takings-assuming that those uses implicate property interests, are duly
authorized by Congress, and serve some public use.66 Part 1HI.A discusses
what I shall refer to as the Expansive View, under which all or most uses
that satisfy these other conditions qualify as takings for which just
compensation is due. Part HLI.B discusses the Middle View, under which
some but not all such uses qualify, and Part Hi.C the Narrow View under
which virtually none of these uses implicate federal liability under the Fifth
Amendment. Part DII.D assesses the merits of these competing views.
A. The Expansive View
To understand the Expansive View requires a brief digression into a
body of case law developed under the Court of Claims Act,67 the Tucker
Act,68 and the Act of June 25, 1910,69 federal statutes that authorize certain

62. But see infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that, even
under the multi factor test, only those uses that deprive the intellectual property owner of virtually
all of the value of her property qualify as takings).
63. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1994)).
64. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 79-129 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
67. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 14911509 (1994) and other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
68. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1994) and other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
69. 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994)).
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suits against the United States government. One provision of the modem
version of the Act of June 25, 1910,28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), states in relevant
part that:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent
of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful
right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy
shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his
reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of
an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person,
firm, or corporation for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, shall
70 be
construed as use or manufacture for the United States.
Courts on many occasions have described section 1498(a) as a vehicle for
patent owners to assert claims for takings of their patents by the federal
government.7 ' In Motorola, Inc. v. United States,72 for example, the
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994). Title 28, § 1498(b), which was enacted in 1960, provides
an analogous right to just compensation for copyright owners whose works are used by the federal
government. See id. § 1498(b); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.01 [E][1] (1997) (discussing § 1498(b)). This provision, however, has been "rarely
construed." See Auerbach v. Sverdrup Corp., 829 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cited in 3
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 12.01[EI[1], at 12-33; see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
GovernmentalUse of CopyrightedProperty:The Sovereign'sPrerogative,67 TEX. L. REV. 685,
695-703 (1989) (noting that § 201(e) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(e), might be read as
prohibiting federal government from effecting takings of copyrights, but that to read statute in this
fashion would conflict with § 1498(b)).
Claims against the United States for the infringement of a trademark in violation of state law
canbefiled in federal district courtunder theFederalTort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 267180 (1994). See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 25:63, at 25-102. Violations of federal trademark
law may not be asserted under this act, however, see id., and at least one court has held that the
United States is immune from suits under the Lanham Act. See id. at 25-103 (citing Preferred Risk
Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1245 (1997)).
Butsee cases citedsupranote 19 (holdingthatCongress has waivedU.S. Postal Service's immunity
from suit for violation of Lanham Act).
71. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566,1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The
government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of property
under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain...."); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331,336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that an action under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 is "based on principles related to the taking of property, namely a patent license,
and subjects the United States to payment of appropriate compensation therefor"); Trojan, Inc. v.
Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854,857 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., concurring) (stating that "28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) is an eminent domain law," but questioning whether it applies "to all possible
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plaintiff filed suit against the United States for the alleged unauthorized
use by the United States Marine Corps of a patented radar transponder.73
In its defense, the United States argued that the claim was barred because
the plaintiff had failed to notify the United States of its prospective
infringement in accordance with a provision of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 287, that governs the use of patent notices on patented articles. 74 The
Federal Circuit rejected this defense, concluding that section 1498(a)
actions are not identical to infringement actions under the Patent Act, and
that the defense set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 287 is not incorporated into section

cases wherein patents may be infringed by or on behalfof the government, whether or not grounded
in 'public use' within the meaning of the fifth amendment"); Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729
F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984), discussed infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text; Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 519-20 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing action under §
1498(a) as implicating "the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Decca Ltd. v.
United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166-67 & n.17 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("Section 1498 ...authorizes the
Government to take, through exercise of its power of eminent domain, a license in any United States
patent."); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958,964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) ("When the government
has infringed, it is deemed to have 'taken' the patent license under an eminent domain theory, and
compensation is thejustcompensation required by the fifth amendment."); Tektronix, Inc. v. United
States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("It is settled that recovery of reasonable compensation
under § 1498 is premised on a theory of an eminent domain taking under the Fifth Amendment.");
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (describing government manufacture
or use of patented invention as a taking); Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1391 (Ct. CI.
1972) (same); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (Nichols,
J., concurring) (same); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633,635 (Ct. CI. 1950)
(same); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 15, 18 (1996) (same); McCreary v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 533, 536 n.1 (1996) (same), affdmem., 114 F.3d 1206 (1997); Penda Corp. v.
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 533,573 (1993) (same); Messerschmidt v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 1,
44 (1993) (same), affidmem., 14 F.3d 613 (1994); Halas v. United States, 28 Fed. CI. 354,360 n. 10
(1993) (same); Judin v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 759,773 (1993) (same). But see De Graffenried
v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 386-89 (1993) (concluding that § 1498(a) actions are not eminent
domain proceedings); Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204,207-08 (1996) (agreeing
with De Graffenried).
72. 729 F.2d 765 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
73. See id. at 766-67.
74. See id. at 767-68. More specifically, Motorola had sold to the Marine Corps 30 units of
the patented invention, none of which were marked with notice of Motorola's patent rights. See id.
at 767. The Corps subsequently published a request for proposals to supply an additional 112 units.
Motorola filed a response to the request which referred to the patent, but the Corps awarded the
contract to another firm. See id. Several years later, Motorola sued for patent infringement. The
Claims Court, however, granted summary judgment for the United States, on the ground that
Motorola had failed to adequately notify the Corps, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 287, that its use
of the subject invention would constitute an infringement. In relevant part, § 287 provides that,
when the patentee fails to mark its patented article with the word "Patent" (or the abbreviation
"Pat.") together with the patent number "no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any
action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and
continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement
occurring after such notice." 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
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1498." 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly characterized the
section 1498(a) action as one in which "the patent owner is seeking to
recover just compensation for the Government's unauthorized taking and
use of his invention, 76 and asserted that "[t]he theoretical basis for his
recovery is the doctrine of eminent domain., 77 As a consequence, in a
section 1498(a) action "the United States is not in the position of an
'
ordinary infringer, but rather a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee."78
The characterization of the federal government's manufacture or use of
a patented invention as a taking can be traced to language found in a series
of United States Supreme Court decisions from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.7 9 In the first of these decisions, James v.
Campbell,80 the plaintiff alleged that a United States Postmaster had
engaged in the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's patented stamping
machine."' Although the Court ruled in favor of the defendant, on the
ground that he had not, in fact, infringed the plaintiff's patent, 82 the Court
suggested in very broad language that any unauthorized use attributable to
the federal government would constitute a taking:
That the government of the United States when it grants
letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts,
confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by
the government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no
doubt. The Constitution gives to Congress power "to promote
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries," which could not be
effected if the government had a reserved right to publish
such writings or to use such inventions without the consent of
the owner. Many inventions relate to subjects which can only
be properly used by the government, such as explosive shells,

75. See Motorola,729 F.2d at 768-72.
76. Id. at 768.

77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Many of the cases cited in supra note 71 cite one or more of these Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966-67 (Ct. CL. 1979)
(discussing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881), and Crozier v. Fried. Krupp
Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290 (1912)).
80. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
81. See id.at 357.
82. See id. at 383 (concluding that the machine used by the postmaster "was different from
that which was patented").
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rams, and submarine batteries to be attached to armed vessels.
If it could use such inventions without compensation, the
inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and
experiments.83
The Court quoted this language with approval five years later in Hollister
v. Benedict & Burnham Co.,84 in the course of reversing, on the ground of
obviousness, a judgment in favor of a patentee;85 and again seven years
later in UnitedStates v. Palmer,86 an opinion affirming ajudgment against
the United States in a case involving the Army's use and manufacture of
patented infantry equipment.87 In the 1912 case of Crozierv. Fried.Krupp
Aktiengesellschaft,88involving the alleged manufacture and use ofpatented
gun improvements by the Army's Chief of Ordnance,89 the Court referred
three times to actions filed under the 1910 amendment to the Court of
Claims Act as actions in "eminent domain,"' and twice described the
government's unauthorized manufacture or use of a patent as a "taking."9
Finally, in William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v.
InternationalCurtisMarine Turbine Co.,92 the Court once again referred
to the government's use of a patent as a taking,9 3 in the course of rejecting
83. Id. at 357-58. The Court also rejected the argument that, in issuing the patent, the United
States could be deemed as having reserved a right to use the invention for its own purposes:
t]he United States has no such prerogative as that which is claimed by the sovereigns
of England, by which it can reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a
superior dominion and use in that which it grants by letters-patent to those who entitle
themselves to such grants. The government of the United States, as well as the citizen,
is subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a patent the grantee is entitled to it
as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case
in England, as a matter of grace and favor.
Id. at 358.
84. 113 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1885).
85. See id. at 70-73.
86. See 128 U.S. 262,270-71 (1888) (quoting James, 104 U.S. at 357-58).
87. In Palmer,the plaintiff owned two patents forimprovements in infantry equipment, which
he had demonstrated before an army board. Upon that board's recommendation, the Secretary of
War authorized the manufacture and purchase for use by the army of equipment that embodied the
patents. When the government failed to pay for the use of the improvements, the plaintiff filed suit
in the Court of Claims and was awarded a reasonable royalty. See id. at 262-64. The Supreme Court
affirmed. See id. at 272.
88. 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
89. See id. at 297-300.
90. See id. at 305, 307, 308.
91. See id. at 306,307. The Court nevertheless reversed ajudgment in favor of the plaintiff,
on the ground that the action, which had been commenced in the Supreme Court for the District of
Columbia, should have been filed in the Court of Claims. See id. at 309.
92. 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
93. See id. at 39-40,42,44.
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a government contractor's argument that its use of a patent in the course
of fulfilling a government contract was a "licensed" transaction.94
The difficulty lies in determining whether to take at face value the
Court's characterization, in James and subsequent cases, of unauthorized
government uses of patents as takings. One problem is that, in each of
these cases, the language referring to "takings" and "eminent domain" is,
arguably, only dicta.' As noted above, in James the Court held that the
defendant postmaster had not used the plaintiff's invention,96 thus
rendering superfluous the discussion of whether such a use otherwise
would have constituted a taking. In Hollister,the Court also ruled against
the patentee on the merits, 97 and in Palmer the principal question was
whether Palmer's claim against the United States could be characterized
as a claim for breach of contract. 9 Deciding whether the army's activities
also constituted a taking was, therefore, unnecessary to the disposition of
the case. In Krupp, the Court held that the lower court had properly
dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff should have filed in
the Court of Claims. 99 Finally, in William Cramp & Sons, the Court held
that a government contractor'sunlicensed use of a patent infringed."
Once again, the issue of whether some or all of the claims within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims are also takings claims was largely
extraneous to the issue before the Court.
Moreover, at least one case the Court decided in between Palmerand
Krupp casts some doubt upon the theory that all unauthorized government
uses of a patent constitute takings. To understand why this is so requires
a brief foray into the history of the Court of Claims and Tucker Acts. At
the time James was decided, and at the time the Palmer litigation was
commenced, the Tucker Act had not yet been enacted. The Court of Claims
Act, however, at that time conferred jurisdiction upon that court to hear
"all claims founded upon any law of congress or upon any regulation of an
94. See id. at 37-45.
95. Judge Andewelt of the Court of Federal Claims not long ago made the same observation
with regard to three earlier Court of Claims decisions that referred to actions under § 1498(a) as
actions in eminent domain. See De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 386-87 (1993).
96. See supra text accompanying note 82.
97. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
98. Only if it could be so characterized was jurisdiction proper in the Court of Claims, where
Palmer had initiated the lawsuit, under the version of the Court of Claims Act in force at that time.
See Palmer, 128 U.S. at 269-71; see also infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing
Court of Claims' jurisdiction over breach of contract claims).
99. See Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 309 (1912).
100. See William Cramp & Sons, 246 U.S. at 37-45. Congress subsequently overruled the
result in William Cramp & Sons; a government contractor is no longer liable to the patentee, as long
as his use ofthe patent is with the authorization or consent ofthe federal government. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) (paragraphs 1 and 2); 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.0613][a], at 16279 to -281 (1998).
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executive department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the
government of the United States.... ."'o Given that patent infringement
claims are "founded upon [a] law of congress"--namely, the Patent
Act-one might expect that the language quoted above would have been
interpreted to mean that the Court of Claims could entertain patent
infringement claims against the United States. In fact, however, the
Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the words "founded upon any
law of congress" as bestowing upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction only
over claims arising out of legislation authorizing suits against the United
States, 0 2 and the Patent Act has never contained any such authorization.
Given, then, (1) that the Court of Claims Act otherwise excluded from the
court's jurisdiction claims sounding in tort,0 3 and (2) that patent
infringement is a tort, one might imagine that the Court's restrictive
interpretation of the words "founded upon [a] law of Congress" would
have resulted in the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
any claims involving patent infringement. The Supreme Court in James
nevertheless suggested (albeit once again in dicta, given that the actual case
before the Court had not been filed in the Court of Claims and that neither
of the parties had raised thejurisdictional issue)" one possible way around
this problem: if the claim could be construed as a claim for breach of an
implied contract on the part of the government to compensate the patentee,
instead of for patent infringement, the Court of Claims would have
jurisdiction to hear the case under its power to hear claims founded "upon
any contract, express or implied."'0 5 The Palmer Court later adopted this
reasoning and concluded that the Court of Claims had properly exercised
jurisdiction over Palmer's suit, in light of the evidence that the government
had used the subject patents with Palmer's consent pursuant to an implied
agreement that he would thereafter receive compensation."
101. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, § 1.
102. See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 n.42 (1988) ('To determine
whether one may bring, pursuant to Tucker Act jurisdiction, a 'claim against the United States
founded... upon ... any Act of Congress,' 'one must always ask.., whether the.., legislation
which the claimant cites can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government forthe damage sustained' ") (quoting28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1982), and Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Garland, 124
U.S. 581, 598-99 (1888).
103. See James, 104 U.S. at 358-59 (noting that Court of Claims' jurisdiction did not extend
to torts). This limitation was subsequently codified in the Tucker Act. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 505, § 1.
104. See James, 104 U.S. at 358-59.
105. See id.
106. See Palmer,128 U.S. at 269. Cf. 8 CHISUM, supranote 100, § 21.02 [1], at 21-27 to -28
(noting that claims for breach of patent licenses and agreements to assign patent rights are viewed
as arising under state contract law, not federal patent law, "even though the existence of contract
liability requires resolution of patent issues such as validity and infringement").
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In 1887, Congress enacted the Tucker Act, which, among other things,
authorized the Court of Claims to hear, in addition to the claims described
in the Court of Claims Act, claims "founded upon the Constitution of the
United States.""1 7 Once again, one might think that the express language
of the statute, coupled now with two Supreme Court decisions
characterizing the unauthorized use of a patent by the government as a
taking, would have resulted in a consensus that the Court of Claims now
had jurisdiction to hear all cases involving such uses on the part of the
federal government. The Supreme Court nevertheless was quick to reject
this reasoning in Schillingerv. UnitedStates.0 8 In Schillinger,the plaintiff
had filed suit in the Court of Claims for compensation allegedly due as a
result of the unlawful use by a government contractor of a patented process
for laying concrete pavement."° In affirming the dismissal of his claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court distinguished
Palmeron the ground that, in this case, there had been no consent by the
patentee to the government's use of his invention, and therefore that no
implied promise of compensation had arisen; as a result, the plaintiff's
claim sounded in tort, not contract. 10 Of greater interest, however, is
Justice Brewer's caustic rebuttal of the takings theory:
It is said that the Constitution forbids the taking of private
property for public uses without just compensation; that
therefore every appropriation of private property by any
official to the uses of the government, no matter however
wrongfully made, creates a claim founded upon the Constitution of the United States and within the letter of the grant in
the act of 1887 of the jurisdiction to the Court of Claims. If
that argument be good, it is equally good applied to every
other provision of the Constitution as well as to every law of
Congress. This prohibition of the taking of private property
for public use without compensation is no more sacred than
that other constitutional provision that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Can it be that Congress intended that every wrongful
arrest and detention of an individual, or seizure of his
property by an officer of the government, should expose it to
an action for damages in the Court of Claims? If any such
breadth ofjurisdiction was contemplated, language which had
already been given a restrictive meaning would have been
107. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359,24 Stat. 505, § 1.
108. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
109. See id. at 164-65. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the contractor hired by the United
States to lay a concrete pavement on the grounds of the United States Capitol had used a patented
process without the patentee's permission. See id.
110. See id. at 169-70.
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carefully avoided.''
The Court thereafter continued to adhere to the distinctions recognized
in Schillinger-findingCourt of Claims jurisdiction over patent disputes
proper only when the claim could be characterized as sounding in
contract-in three other cases decided prior to Krupp."' It is, therefore,
debatable whether the holding in Krupp (that the plaintiff had a right to sue
the United States for damages, but only in the Court of Claims) would have
been the same, notwithstanding the Court's references to takings and
eminent domain, had Congress not enacted the Act of June 25, 1910 just
prior to the decision in Krupp specifically to grant the Court of Claims
jurisdiction to award "reasonable compensation" "whenever an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall... be used
by the United States without license of the owner thereof ... .""' In light
of this statutory change, the Krupp Court did not have to decide whether
the facts would have made out a claim for breach of an implied contract. 4
Perhaps the preceding discussion reads too much into Schillinger.For
one thing, the Court's later pronouncements in Krupp, to the effect that a
government employee's use without consent of the patentee constitutes a
taking, might be read as a rejection of Schillinger's ostensibly narrower
view of the Takings Clause." 5 In addition, Schillinger arguably can be
distinguished from James and Palmeron at least two grounds. The first is
the Court's observation in Schillinger that the person who allegedly
infringed the patent at issue in that case was a government contractor, not
a government official or employee. 1 6 The Court on other occasions has
asserted that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of uncompensated takings
"is directed against the Government, and not against individual or public
officers proceeding without the authority of legislative enactment";"' thus,
a deprivation that remains unauthorized, "expressly or by necessary
implication . . . by some act of Congress, is not the act of the

111. Id. at 168.
112. See Harley v..United States, 198 U.S. 229,235 (1905) (affirmingjudgment that Court of
Claims jurisdiction was improper, based on evidence refuting claim of implied contract); Russell
v. United States, 182 U.S. 516, 530, 535 (1901) (finding jurisdiction improper); United States v.
Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552,566-68 (1895) (finding jurisdiction proper under implied
contract theory).
113. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851.
114. Cf. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating that "the
implied contract theory was not applicable" in Krupp).
115. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Krupp).
116. Compare supratext accompanying note 107 with supra text accompanying note 81 and
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
117. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322,335-36 (1910).
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Government."' 8 The SchillingerCourt's refusal to find a taking therefore
may be attributable in part to its conclusion that the infringer lacked the
congressional authorization to use the patented process that would have
rendered the government responsible for his acts." 9 A second argument in

118. Id. at 336; see also Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 127 n.16
(1974) (quoting Hooe, 218 U.S. at 336); Southern Cal. Fin. Corp. v. United States, 634 F.2d 521,
523-25 (Ct. CI. 1980) (sufficient authorization will be found if government action flows from "the
good faith implementation of a Congressional Act") (cited in William J. Baumol & Thomas W.
Merrill, DeregulatoryTakings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract,and the Telecommunications
Act of1996,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1054 n.63 (1997)) (quoting NBH Land Co. v. United States,
576 F.2d 317,319 (Ct. Cl. 1978)). Cf. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1,13 (1990) (declining to "decide
what types of official authorization, if any, are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth
Amendment"). Just how specific the legislative authorization must be, however, in order to
implicate the Fifth Amendment can be difficult to determine. See infra notes 234-48 and
accompanying text.
119. This ground for distinguishing Schillinger,however, does not make it much easier to
square the language in the James line of cases with the Court's post-Schillinger,pre-Kruppdecision
in Harley v. UnitedStates, 198 U.S. 229 (1905). In Harley,the plaintiff, a United States Treasury
employee, alleged that two high-ranking government officials-the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing-had infringed his patented device for
registering the number of impressions made by a plate-printing press. See id. at 229-30. Although
one would think that the activities in which these officials were alleged to have engaged would have
been within the normal scope of their duties, and therefore perhaps implicitly authorized by
Congress, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground that the facts alleged did not state a claim for breach of implied contract.
See id. at 234-36.
Justice Harlan (who was, coincidentally, the author of the Hooe opinion, quoted infra at text
accompanying notes 234-35) dissented in Schillingeronthe ground that the contractor's activities
were sufficiently authorized by the government to qualify as a taking:
Under the authority given by Congress to expend the money appropriated in
improving the Capitol grounds according to specified plans, the Architect of the
Capitol had a large discretion, and was authorized, so far as the government was
concerned, to use in such improvement any patented invention that those plans would
require, or that would best subserve the public interests, subject of course to the
constitutional obligation to makejust compensation to the inventor. The Constitution
imposing that obligation is a covenant between the government and every citizen
whose property is appropriated by it for public use.... If the act of Congress under'
which the Architect proceeded had, in express terms, directed him to use Schillinger's
invention in any pavement laid down in the public grounds, then such use... would
have made a case of implied contact based on the constitutional obligation to make
just compensation for private property taken for public use. But such a case is not
distinguishable, in principle, from the present one, where the Architect, proceeding
under a general authority to expend the public money according to specified plans,
uses or knowingly permits to be used a particular patented invention ....
Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 178 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also dissented in two other
important cases from roughly the same time period involving the government's use of patents. See
International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601,606-17 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and
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favor of a narrow reading of Schillinger is that the Court in that case also
expressed doubt as to whether the government's mere use of pavement that
was allegedly constructed by means of a patented process-but which was
not itself a patented article-deprived the plaintiff of a property interest.1 20
(Until very recently, the use of an article that itself is not patented did not
constitute patent infringement, even if the article was created by means of
a patented process without the consent of the patentee.)12 ' Perhaps, then,
Schillingeronly stands for the unobjectionable proposition that a use of a
patent must be authorized, expressly or implicitly, by Congress in order for
it to qualify as a taking by the federal government. 122 The fact nevertheless
remains that, in the one (or perhaps two) 123 instances that arose during the
period of time we have been discussing in which the depiction of the
government's unauthorized use as a taking would have affected the
outcome of the case, the Court expressly chose not to characterize the use
in that fashion.
Moreover, one might argue that it is perhaps just as plausible to read
Krupp as being consistent with the SchillingerCourt's ostensibly narrow
view of the Takings Clause, as it is to read Schillingeras being consistent
with Krupp's ostensibly liberal view. As noted above, the only issue
squarely before the Court in Krupp was whether the plaintiff should have
filed the action in the Court of Claims under the Act of June 25, 19 10.124
A close reading of the opinion suggests, however, that in characterizing the
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 27-28 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In both cases, the Court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction compelling government officials, who allegedly
had engaged in the unauthorized manufacture or use of a patented invention, to refrain from using
articles belonging to the government which incorporated that invention. The Court reasoned that
it could not interfere with property of the United States government without having the United
States before it as a party, and that it could not compel the United States to be a party absent a
waiver of sovereign immunity. See Bruce, 194 U.S. at 605; Belknap, 161 U.S. at 23-25.
120. See Schillinger,155 U.S. at 171-72. This ground for distinguishing Schillingeralso does
not make Harley any easier to square with James,Palmer,and Krupp, inasmuch as the government
officials in Harleywere alleged to have used the patented invention, not merely an article produced
by a patented process. See Harley, 198 U.S. at 229-33.
121. It was not until 1989 that the Patent Act was amended so as to render the user of the
unpatented article, as well as the user ofthe patented process, liable under these circumstances. See
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-64, 1566-67, Pub. L. No.
100-418, §§ 9003, 9006 (enacting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).
122. For evidence that this was Justice Brewer's view, see his later opinion in United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 455, 458-65 (1903) (a case involving a taking of land), in the course of which
he attempts to reconcile the various strands of the Court's patent/takings jurisprudence to that time.
123. See supra note 119 (discussing Harley, 198 U.S. 229 (1905)); see alsoTurton v. United
States, 212 F.2d 354,355 (6th Cir. 1954) (holding, without addressing takings theory, that United
States was immune from liability for copyright infringement); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d
1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Turton for proposition that copyright infringement allegedly
committed by United States government did not constitute taking).
124. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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amended act (the predecessor of section 1498(a)) as creating a claim
against the United States for a taking of patent rights,"z the Court may
have meant that the statute converted into takings actions that otherwise
would have been only wrongful acts on the part of the government official
(even if within the scope of his official duties) for which the federal
government would not have been responsible. In concluding that the
amendment authorized patentees to sue in the Court of Claims regardless
of whether the evidence could support a claim for breach of contract, the
Court stated:
the statute endows any owner of a patent with the right to
establish . . . the truth of his belief that his rights have
been... appropriated by an officer of the United States, and
if he does so establish such appropriation, that the United
States shall be considered as having ratified the act of the
officer, and be treated as responsible pecuniarily for the
consequences... The adoption by the United States of the
wrongful act of an officer is, of course, an adoption of the act
when and as committed, and causes such act of the officer to
be, in virtue of the statute, a rightful appropriation by the
government, for which compensation is provided .... [I]n
view of... the undoubted authority of the United States...
to exert the power of eminent domain, the statute, looking at
the substance of things, provides for the appropriation of a
license to use the inventions, the appropriation thus made
being sanctioned by the means of compensation for which the
statute provides. 12
One possible interpretation of this language is that the 1910 amendment
caused the United States to "ratif[y]" acts for which it otherwise would not
have been responsible, even in theory. By virtue of having ratified those
acts, the government could be said to have effected a taking. 127 In other
words, the Court may not have meant that any use of a patent by a
government official within the scope of his official duties constituted a
taking, outside the context of the amendment, but rather that the

125. See Crozier v. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 306 (1912) (stating that "the
statute makes full and adequate provision for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
which... it was the purpose of the statute to provide," and that "no contention was made.., that
the statute of 1910 does not provide methods ofcompensation adequate to the exercise of the power
of taking for which the statute provides").
126. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 308 (stating that the government had acquired a license to use the plaintiff's
invention "under the right of eminent domain, as the result of the statute of 1910") (emphasis
added).
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amendment itself transformed those acts into takings.12
Even if this interpretation of Krupp is correct, however, all it means is
that the Fifth Amendment does not require the federal government to
provide compensation for uses by government officials within the scope of
their official duties, where Congress has not specifically authorized or
ratified the use; uses that are sufficiently authorized or ratified after the fact
would still constitute takings, assuming that they satisfy some public
purpose.'29 In this regard, even the narrow reading of Krupp would be
consistent with the view that the government may effect a taking even
when its use does not destroy all or most of the value of the subject
property.
B. The Middle View
Support for what I shall refer to as the "Middle View" of the takings
question as applied to intellectual property-that some but not all
legislatively-authorized government uses constitute takings, and that a
court must engage a fact-sensitive, particularized analysis to determine the
status of any specific use-can be found in the only recent case in which
the Supreme Court has considered an alleged taking of intellectual
property, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.'30 The dispute in Monsanto
centered on certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),"' as amended by the Federal Pesticide Act of
1978.132 As originally enacted, FIFRA required all pesticide manufacturers
to register their products with the Secretary of Agriculture and authorized
the Secretary to require those manufacturers to submit data, including
product formulas, relating to any claims made by them to the public
concerning the efficacy of their products. 3 3 In 1970, Congress transferred

128. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. CI. 1979) (stating that Act
of 1910 "adopts the infringement as the act of the United States and makes it a rightful exercise of
the power of eminent domain").
129. See infra notes 234-48 (discussing authorization). Cf. William Cramp & Sons Ship &
Engine Bldg. Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28,41 (1918) (stating that
"the right to recover by implied contract as existing prior to 1910 and the right to recover given by
[the predecessor statute to § 1498(a)] both rest upon the possession and exertion of official
authority"). But see Freiman v. Lazur, 925 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that United
States was proper defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), where government employee allegedly
infringed copyright within scope of his employment but in violation of federal procurement laws),
discussed infra at notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
130. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
131. Pub. L. No. 80-104,61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y
(West 1980 & Supp. 1997)).
132. Pub. L. No. 95-396,92 Stat. 819 (1978).
133. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 991 (citing FIFRA, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 61 Stat. 166-67).
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authority for the administration of FIFRA to the EPA 3 4 and required EPA
to determine, as a condition for granting registration, that the product at
issue would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the
' The 1972 legislation also allowed EPA
environment."135
to consider data
submitted by one registration applicant for the purpose of considering
another's application relating to a similar chemical, provided that the
second applicant offered to compensate the first for the use of those data.'36
The legislation permitted applicants, however, to designate data submitted
to the agency as "trade secrets or commercial or financial information,"' 37
and prohibited EPA from publicly disclosing any information that, in its
judgment, contained or related such "trade secrets or commercial or
financial information."' 38 In addition, the statute forbade EPA from using
any such confidential information in support of another applicant's
registration application, unless the owner of that information consented. 3 9
The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 amended these disclosure and use
provisions in three crucial respects. First, the act provided that applicants
could have exclusive use of any data relating to "new active ingredients
contained in pesticides" registered on or after October 1, 1978, but only for
ten years, after which EPA could use those data in support of another's
application without limitation. " Second, the act permitted EPA to use any
other data, submitted after December 31, 1969, for the purpose of
considering another applicant's registration application-regardless of
whether those data qualified as trade secrets or other confidential
information-as long as the second applicant offered to compensate the
first.'"' Third, the act authorized EPA to disclose certain health, safety, and

134. See id. (citing Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), 5 U.S.C.
App. at 1132 (1970)).
135. Id. at 991-92 (quoting Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 [hereinafter
FEPCA], Pub. L. No. 92-516, §§ 3(c)(5)(C), (D), 86 Stat. 973, 980-81).
136. See id. at 992 (citing FEPCA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 980). As the Court noted, "[t]he
amount of compensation was to be negotiated by the parties, or, in the event negotiations failed,
was to be determined by EPA, subject to judicial review upon the instigation of the original data
submitter." Id.; see FEPCA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 980.
137. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 992 (quoting FEPCA, § 10(a), 86 Stat. 989).
138. Id. (quoting FEPCA, § 10(b), 86 Stat. 989). The statute also authorized the applicant to
file a declaratory judgment action in federal district court in the event that EPA disagreed with the
applicant's designation of material as "trade secrets or commercial or financial information." See
id. (citing FEPCA, § 10(c), 86 Stat. 989).
139. See id. at 992-93 (citing FEPCA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 980).
140. See id. at 994-95 (citing Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, § 2(a)(1), 92 Stat. 820).
141. See id. (citing Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, § 2(a)(1), 92 Stat. 820-21). The Court noted
that, if the parties could not reach agreement on the amount of compensation, either was entitled
to commence a binding arbitration proceeding, the results of which would not be subject to judicial
review absent a showing of fraud; and that if the first applicant refused to negotiate or to participate
in the arbitration, he would forfeit his claim for compensation. See id. (citing Federal Pesticide Act
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environmental data, including trade secrets and other confidential
information, if the Administrator determined that disclosure was
"necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment."' 42 In response to these amendments, Monsanto Company,
a manufacturer of pesticides and other chemicals, filed suit in federal
district court, arguing that the legislation effected a taking without just
compensation. 143 The district court agreed and enjoined the EPA
Administrator from implementing or enforcing those provisions.'44
On appeal, the Supreme Court turned first to the question of whether
the information Monsanto had submitted to EPA was a form of property
protected under the Fifth Amendment. 45 The Court answered this question
in the affirmative, noting, among other things, that much of the information
qualified as trade secrets under Missouri law; that trade secrets "have many
of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property," including
assignability and the capacity to form the res of a trust; and that the Court
in the past had recognized other types of intangible property, such as liens
and contracts, as being subject to the Takings Clause.' 46 Second, in order
to determine whether the 1978 legislation effected a taking of this property,
47
the Court stated that "several factors ... should be taken into account,"'
including "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact,
4
and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations."'
The Court nevertheless focused its attention principally upon the lastnamed factor, the degree to which the governmental action had interfered
with Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 4 9
First, the Court considered whether Monsanto had a reasonable
investment-backed expectation that EPA would keep the data submitted on
or after October 1, 1978-the effective date of the 1978 legislation
described above--"confidential beyond the limits prescribed in the
amended statute itself."' 50 The Court concluded that it did not, because the
amendment gave fair notice that EPA could disclose or use any
information submitted on or after that date, subject to the statutory
criteria. 5 ' As a consequence, Monsanto could "hardly argue that its

of 1978, § 2(a)(1), 92 Stat. 821).
142. Id. at 995-97 (quoting Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, § 15, 92 Stat. 830-31).
143. See id. at 998-99.
144. See id. at 1000; seealso Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm'r, United States EPA, 564 F. Supp.
552, 564-69 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
145. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001-03.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1005.
148. Id. (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1006.
151. See id. at 1006-07.
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reasonable investment-backed expectations [would be] disturbed" if
information it "chose to submit... in order to receive a registration"
was
52
disclosed or used in accordance with the statutory scheme.
Second, the Court considered whether Monsanto had a reasonable
expectation of secrecy with regard to data submitted prior to October 22,
1972, the effective date of the 1972 amendments to FIFRA 1 53 Again, the
Court concluded that any such expectation would not have been
reasonable, because prior to that date no provision of FIFRA addressed the
issue of whether the government was required to keep information
submitted under the statute secret. "4Moreover, although the Federal Trade
Secrets Act imposed a criminal penalty upon any government employee
who disclosed trade secrets revealed to him in the course of his official
duties,' the Court reasoned that this act did not give rise to a reasonable
expectation that the information submitted by Monsanto prior to 1972
would remain secret forever, because the act specifically exempted from
liability any disclosures made in a manner authorized by law. 5 6 The Court
described the ex ante likelihood that Congress 5would
someday authorize
7
the disclosure of this material as "substantial."'
The Court nevertheless concluded that the 1978 amendments to FIFRA
did effect a taking with regard to information submitted to EPA during the
interim period from October 22, 1972 to September 30, 1978.58 As noted
above, under the rules in effect at that time EPA was flatly prohibited from
disclosing trade secret information and from using any such data in
connection with other companies' applications. 59 As a consequence, the
Court reasoned, any disclosure or use of this information pursuant to the
1978 amendments "would frustrate Monsanto's reasonable investmentbacked expectation with respect to" the data."6 Moreover, because "the
value of a trade secret lies in the competitive advantage it gives its owner
over competitors," the Court reasoned that any disclosure or use would
cause Monsanto to lose its property interest in the information.61 Thus, the
disclosure or use of any trade secrets submitted during this interim period

152. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute placed an unconstitutional
condition upon the right to receive a government benefit, reasoning that imposing upon the
applicant the risk of losing a property right in return for obtaining government approval to market
its product was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See id. at 1007-08.
153. See id. at 1008-14.
154. See id. at 1008-10.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
156. See Monsanto,467 U.S. at 1008-10.
157. See id. at 1008-09.
158. See iL at 1010-14.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
160. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011.
161. See id. at 1011-12&n.15.
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could constitute a taking of private property.162
Finally, the Court considered whether any taking effected pursuant to
the statutory provisions at issue would be for "public use," as required by
the Fifth Amendment, and whether the district court had properly enjoined
EPA from enforcing those provisions. 161While recognizing that "the most
direct beneficiaries" of any taking effected under the data-sharing
provisions of the 1978 legislation would be later applicants, the Court
found a sufficient public purpose insofar as data-sharing could serve to
"eliminate costly duplication of research and streamline the registration
process, making new end-use products available to consumers more
quickly."1' 4 Similarly, the data-disclosure provisions arguably served a
public purpose by allowing "members of the public to determine the
likelihood of individualized risks peculiar to their use of a product," even
though the product had previously met with EPA approval. 65 The Court
nevertheless vacated the injunction on the grounds that injunctive relief "is
not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking," and that, in the event the
statute did result in a taking of private property, such a suit could be
brought in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act.166
In summary, under the approach applied in Monsanto, it is clear that at
least some legislatively-authorized government uses of intellectual
property do not constitute takings; and that the multifactor analysis which
the Court applies in cases involving alleged regulatory takings 67 (as
opposed to the categorical rule applied in cases involving physical
invasions)1 68 should govern in at least some cases involving intellectual
property. In both of these respects, Monsanto appears to depart from the
James line of cases, all of which analogize government uses of one form
of intellectual property, patents, to the taking of an easement over real
162. See id. at 1013-14. The Court asserted, however, that if the government's disclosure of
a trade secret causes the owner's profits to fall in response to greater public awareness of a
product's harmful effects, rather than by affecting the owner's competitive edge over other
manufacturers, the disclosure would not constitute a taking, given that the value of the secret "lies
in the competitive advantage it gives its owner over competitors." See id. at 1011-12 n.15.
163. See id. at 1014-16.
164. Id. at 1014-15.
165. See id at 1015-16.

166. See id. at 1016-20 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682,697 n.18 (1949)). The Court also noted that, since the evidence did not disclose that any taking
had yet occurred, it was possible that the compensation scheme set forth in the data-sharing
provisions of the 1978 legislation would satisfy the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
requirement with respect to any data disclosed pursuant to those provisions. See id. at 1012-14 &
n.16.
167. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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property for which compensation is always due. If Monsanto signals a
displacement of the principles set forth in James, however, the habit, in
which both the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims continue
to indulge, of invoking the takings mantra when discussing section 1498
claims is at best anachronistic and at worst misleading.
C. The Narrow View
A third possibility, which was suggested recently by Professor Vzquez
and which I shall refer to as the "Narrow View," is that only those
government uses of intellectual property that "virtually destroy" the
property's value qualify as takings.16 9 In support of this view, Vazquez
cites Laurence Tribe's treatise on constitutional law, in which Tribe states
that a regulatory taking occurs "when government controls a person's use
of property so tightly that, although some uses remain to the owner, the
property's value has been virtually destroyed." 170 The Supreme Court, as
Tribe notes, has declined to find takings in cases in which the regulation
at issue has caused real property values to diminish by seventy-five percent
or more, 171 and has acknowledged that regulations which decrease property
values by as much as ninety-five percent may not constitute takings. 72 At
the same time, however, the Court has also suggested that at least some
regulations which fall short of causing such extensive losses may be
viewed as takings under the multifactor approach. 173 Thus, while Vzquez
may be indulging in a slight overstatement when he asserts that only those
regulations that deprive the property owner of virtually all of the value of
his property constitute takings, even the approximate accuracy of this
principle applied to government uses of intellectual property probably
means that few such uses are likely to qualify as takings. As described
below, there appear to be no more than a handful of situations in which the
government's use of intellectual property is likely to "virtually destroy" the
value of that property to its owner.
169. See Carlos Manuel VAzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1745 n.281 (1997) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 57, § 9-3, at 593).
170. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 9-3, at 593.
171. Seeid. at593 n.3.
172. In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court asserted
that there are "at least two discrete categories ofregulatory action" which are "compensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support ofthe restraint": "regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property," and regulations that
"den[y] all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Id. at 1015. While acknowledging
that a landowner whose property value is reduced by less than 100% might not be entitled to an
automatic finding that his property has been subjected to a taking-and "that in at least some cases
the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing"-the Court suggested that at least some such partial
deprivations might qualify as takings under the multi factor approach. See id. at 1019 n.8.
173. See supra note 172.
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The most obvious scenario under which a government use of
intellectual property is likely to eliminate the property's value to its owner
is when the government is the only potential purchaser of the right to use
the property-such as might be the case, for example, with regard to a
patented invention that is useful only for military purposes. 7 4 Relatively
175
few intellectual products are likely to fall into this category, however.
A second instance in which the government might destroy the value of
an intellectual product would be when the government discloses a trade
secret. As the Court noted in Monsanto, such disclosure could effectively
destroy the competitive advantage embodied by the secret, because the
information would then be free for others to use without limitation. 176 For
this reason, Monsanto itself can be viewed as a case espousing the Narrow
View. 77 Mere use of the information by the government, however, would
destroy its value only when the government otherwise would be the only
potential purchaser of the secret, a circumstance
which, for reasons stated
17
1
often.
very
occur
to
unlikely
is
above,
A third possible situation in which a government's use of a work may
destroy all or most of its value to the owner is when the government
incorporates copyrighted material into judicial opinions, statutes,
regulations, or other government documents. Because works of the United
States government are not copyrightable, 179 one might argue that the
incorporation of a copyrighted work into such documents causes the work
to fall into the public domain. 80 Substantial authority suggests, however,
174. See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356,358 (1881) (noting that "[m]any inventions relate
to subjects which can only be properly used by the government," and that "[i]f it could use such
inventions without compensation, the inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and
experiments").
175. Moreover, while there probably are some patented inventions, nonpatented trade secrets,
and copyrighted works of authorship (such as computer programs) that are of use only to
governmental entities, it is difficult to imagine how a nongovernmental entity could create a valid
trademark that subsequently would be useful only to a governmental entity, given that trademarks
rights do not come into existence until a person uses the mark to identify goods or services for sale
to the public. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 25, at 1608. The Lanham Act also prohibits the
registration of any mark that falsely suggests a connection with or disparages any national symbol,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994); or which "[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or
other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality." Id. § 1052(b).
176. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011-12 & n.15; see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)
(reprinted in 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED: CIVIL PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL LAWS 438

(master ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997)) (defining trade secret as information that derives value "from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons").
177. In other words, perhaps there really is no Middle View, but only the Expansive and
Narrow Views, given that the use in Monsanto that was held to potentially effect a taking probably
also would have constituted a taking under the Narrow View.
178. Sie supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994).
180. See Building Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730,731-36 (1st Cir.
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that this argument is incorrect, and that the copyright owner retains her
copyright in such materials notwithstanding their incorporation into
government documents,181 although the value of the copyright may be
diminished to some extent due to the ease with which others may be able
to reproduce works found in government documents. 8 '
Finally, with regard to trademarks, it is perhaps conceivable for the
government to destroy the value of a mark either through infringement or
dilution by using a similar mark or slogan in connection with the
promotion of government products or services. In one recent case, for
example, Ringling Brothers-Barnum &Bailey unsuccessfully claimed that
the State of Utah's Division of Travel Development had diluted the value
of the trademark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH by using the
slogan THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH to promote tourism in the
State of Utah.183 The likelihood of a government use so tarnishing a mark
as to render it virtually worthless nevertheless appears remote, and I am
aware of no instances in which a use of this nature has ever occurred.
Aside from the preceding four scenarios, it is difficult to imagine any
1980) (suggesting that public's due process right of free access to laws requires that state's
incorporation into state administrative regulations of model building code written by private
organization caused code to fall into public domain).
181. See CCC Inf. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73-74 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that references in state statutes and regulations to copyrighted compilation as legal
standard for determining automobile valuations did not result in loss of copyright, and calling into
question validity of Building Officials); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 5.06[C], at 5-91
to 5-92 (arguing that, while government's adoption of copyrighted model code may require
recognition of fairuse defense for one who reproduces code for personal use, it does not thrust code
into public domain, and that commercial publisher should be liable for code's unauthorized
reproduction and distribution); cf. Building Officials, 628 F.2d at 735-36 (stating that legislative
history of 17 U.S.C. § 105 suggests that adoption of copyrighted materials into federal government
publications does not affect copyright protection, but that rule might be different with regard to
incorporation of copyrighted materials into state laws) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 60
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5673).
182. Strictly speaking, the government's ability to diminish the value of a copyrightby making
a work publicly available at little or no cost may not be limited to situations in which the work is
incorporated into government documents; if the government were so minded, it could reduce the
copyright owner's ability to market her work simply by distributing free copies or by posting the
contents on the Internet. Conspiracy theorists may judge for themselves the likelihood of this
scenario coming to pass, but even the most diehard X-Files fan would have to admit that limiting
takings claims to situations like these probably would leave the vast majority of government uses
of intellectual property outside the purview of the Takings Clause.
183. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. ofTravel Dev.,
955 F. Supp. 605,616-22 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding, without addressing sovereign immunity issue,
that defendant's slogan did not cause likelihood of dilution); see also Woelffer v. Happy States of
Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 501-05 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that court had jurisdiction under Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), over counterclaim for injunctive relief asserted against state
official, where counterclaimant alleged, interalia,that state's use of slogan ILLINOIS, YOU PUT
ME IN A HAPPY STATE violated § 43(a) of Lanham Act).
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other circumstances under which the government's use of intellectual
property would be likely to constitute a taking under the Narrow View.
Thus, if Monsanto stands for the proposition that the regulatory takings
framework applies generally to government uses of intellectual property,
and if that framework as applied usually permits the government to avoid
compensating property owners unless state action destroys all or almost all
of the property's value, the Fifth Amendment creates almost no obligation
to compensate intellectual property owners for federal uses of their works.
D. Assessing the Competing Views
The preceding discussion should serve to demonstrate the thoroughly
"muddled" nature of intellectual property takings law. There are
nevertheless two possible ways of trying to reconcile the ostensibly
contradictory strands in the case law, though neither resolution is entirely
satisfactory: either by according little weight to the Court of Claims Act
line of cases emanating from James or by limiting Monsanto to its facts.
For the reasons discussed below, the latter approach, while problematic,
seems at least somewhat more persuasive.
The first possibility is that Monsantoimplicitly overrules those portions
of the older cases which might be read as suggesting that all legislativelyauthorized government uses of intellectual property without the consent of
the owner constitute takings; and that Monsanto stands for the proposition
that all governmental uses of intellectual property should be assessed
instead under the regulatory takings framework. Whether the application
of this framework in turn results in a victory for the Middle or Narrow
View depends upon whether Vzquez is correct in asserting that only those
uses that virtually destroy the value of the property are likely to qualify as
takings.
One virtue of this interpretation is that it would not entail disapproving
of the outcomes of the James line of cases, given that the references to
takings and eminent domain found in those decisions are dicta. 4
Moreover, it seems very likely that the state action at issue in cases such
as James, Palmer,and Krupp would have constituted takings even under
the multifactor approach applied in Monsanto, assuming sufficient
legislative authorization, because of both the economic impact of that
action upon the patent owners and its effect upon their reasonable
expectations. With regard to economic impact, it is noteworthy that the
only potential domestic customer for the military and postal technology at
issue in the three older cases was probably the United States
government.' The uncompensated use of this technology therefore may

184. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
185. See Krupp, 224 U.S. at 299 (stating that United States was engaged in manufacture of
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well have threatened to deprive the patentees of virtually all of the value
attributable to their patents, and if so this factor would weigh heavily in
favor of those uses being characterized as takings under the multi factor
approach. The effect upon the owners' reasonable investment-backed
expectations was also arguably more substantial in all three cases than in
Monsanto. As discussed above, the Monsanto Court concluded that any
disclosure or use, in accordance with the applicable statutory scheme, of
trade secret information submitted to the government prior to October 22,
1972 or after September 30, 1978 would not have interfered with
Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectations, because Monsanto
knew or should have known that submitting information to the government
during those periods of time entailed a risk of such disclosure or use.18 6 In
Jamesand Palmer,by contrast, the Court correctly observed that, when the
government issues a patent, it does not reserve the right to the
uncompensated use of that patent without the consent of the patentee.' 7
Presumably, then, the uses engaged in by the government in those cases
and in Krupp didinterfere with the patentees' reasonable expectations that
no one, including the United States government, would use their
technology without their consent. 8 '
The other possible interpretation would limit Monsanto to its facts, thus
rejecting the proposition that the regulatory takings framework applies in
all cases involving government uses of intellectual property and leaving
open the possibility that many (perhaps most) uses that satisfy the other
relevant criteria189 constitute takings. To justify this interpretation,
however, requires some basis for concluding that the government's use of
intellectual property without the owner's consent is more analogous to the
imposition of an easement over real property than to the regulation of the
use or enjoyment of real property; if the analogy holds, then arguably the
government's use of intellectual property, like the imposition of an
easement, should generally be viewed as effecting a taking, no matter how

plaintiff's patented field guns and gun carriages); Palmer, 128 U.S. at 262 (stating that case
involved alleged use of "infantry equipments"); James, 104 U.S. at 359 (describing subject
invention as "an implement or stamp for postmarking letters and canceling revenue and postage
stamps").
186. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
187. See Palmer, 128 U.S. at 270-71; James, 104 U.S. at 358.
188. But see De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Ct. 384, 387-88 (1993). In De
Graffenried,the court suggested that, because the federal government now has an express right
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) to use patents, such use does not defeat a patentee's reasonable
expectations. See id. The same, however, could be said about real property, which is always held
subject to the sovereign's power of eminent domain.
189. Namely, that the state actors' conduct is authorized by the legislature and that property
is taken for a public use. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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minimally intrusive that use might be."g Support for the analogy can be
derived from the fact that when the government imposes an easement over
real property, it deprives the owner of the right to exclude others from the
property-a right which the Supreme Court has characterized as "so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right [that it]
falls within [the] category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation."'' It is precisely the same right of exclusion with
which the government interferes when it uses one's intellectual property
without consent; and in some respects this right to exclude may be more
fundamental in the context of intellectual property than it is in the context
of real property. A patent, for example, does not confer upon its owner an
affirnative right to make, use, or sell her patented invention, but rather
only the negative right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
19z
it.
Moreover, even when the intellectual property owner's endowment
carries with it an affirmative right of use, the fact that the owner may
continue using the property herself, notwithstanding the government's
concurrent use, cannot mean that the latter use never effects a taking, any
more than the real property owner's ability to continue using his land
notwithstanding the imposition of an easement thereon means that the
government has not effected a taking of land.193 On this reasoning, the
government's imposition of a license to use intellectual property should be
treated in the same manner as would its imposition of a license or easement
over real property.' 94
190. Cf. supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (noting that, when the government
physically occupies or authorizes the occupation of land, it effects a taking, even if the occupation
is in the nature of an easement).
191. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (footnote omitted).
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) (granting patentee right to exclude others from
manufacture, use, and sale of patented invention); 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1997) (same);
see also Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 23 (discussing patentee's lack of affirmative rights).
193. To paraphrase Monsanto, one might contend that the value of a patent, copyright, or
trademark "lies in the competitive advantage it gives its owner over competitors," Monsanto, 467
U.S. at 986, and that this advantage is diminished if others may use the property without
compensation.
194. It also may be relevant that the Court of Claims Act line of cases discussed atsupranotes
71-127 and accompanying text also frequently refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and its predecessor
statute as creating a compulsory licensing procedure. See, e.g., Krupp, 224 U. S. at 305; Motorola,
Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Krupp, 224 U.S. at 290 and Irving
Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950)). These references to licenses
might seem to suggest that the easement analogy is apt, inasmuch as, in the real property context,
the only material difference between an easement and a license is that the latter is revocable at will.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFPROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.2 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1989).
The precedential value of these descriptions of § 1498(a) as a compulsory licensing provision,
however, may be entitled to no greater weight than the same cases' descriptions of all government
uses as takings; as we have seen, the authoritativeness of these latter pronouncements is debatable.
See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
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Like the first interpretation, the preceding argument would not
necessarily require the overruling of prior case law, given that the property
rights at issue in Monsanto-tradesecrets-do not give rise to as broad a
right of exclusion as do the patent rights at issue in James, Palmer,and
Krupp. The owner of a trade secret has a right, among other things, to
exclude one who has acquired the secret under circumstances giving rise
to a duty of confidentiality from disclosing it to others; use or disclosure
under other circumstances, however, does not necessarily impinge upon the
owner's rights. 95 The government's use or disclosure, in accordance with
the applicable statutory criteria, of information Monsanto voluntarily
submitted prior to 1972 or after 1978 therefore did not interfere with
Monsanto's right to exclude, precisely because Monsanto did not have a
right to exclude the use or disclosure of information submitted under
circumstances not giving rise to a duty of confidentiality.' 96 With regard to
information submitted during the interim period from 1972 to 1978,
however, which the government had acquired under an obligation of
confidentiality, the Court in effect adopted a per se rule, concluding that
any abrogation of Monsanto's right to exclude others from access to this
information would constitute a taking. 197 In this regard, the result in
Monsanto is entirely consistent with the dicta in James,Palmer,and Krupp
suggesting that any legislatively-authorized interference with the right to
exclude effects a taking. 98
Finally, one might argue that the typical regulatory takings analysis is
simply inapposite to most legislatively-authorized government uses of
intellectual property, because the reasons for developing a separate
framework for regulatory takings generally do not apply in this context.
Courts and commentators have suggested that not requiring compensation
in most cases in which economic regulation decreases property values may
be attributable largely to the presence of transaction costs: in other words,
because all generally-applicable regulations confer benefits upon some
persons and burdens upon others, requiring the government to compensate
everyone whose property suffers a diminution in value attributable to
regulation would in effect prevent the government from engaging in most
regulatory activity. 9By contrast, when government action has the purpose
195. See Unif.Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(ii), reprintedin 14 UNIFORMLAWs ANNoTATED: CIVIL
PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL LAWS 438 (master ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
196. See Monsanto,467 U.S. at 1005-14.
197. See id. at 1010-12.
198. See id. at 1011 (stating that "[t]he right to exclude others is generally 'one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,' "and that
"[w]ith respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the
property interest") (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
199. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (stating
that "the functional basis" for not requiring compensation is that" 'Government hardly could go
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or effect of singling out specific property and "press[ing] [it] into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm," 2' the action cannot easily be justified as "simply 'adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life' in a manner that secures an 'average
State action that
reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned."'
evidences such a purpose or effect is therefore viewed as effecting a
taking. ' Affirmative uses of someone's patent, trade secret, copyright, or
trademark, however, seem much more similar to the sort of "singling out"
that effects a taking in the land use context than to other types of
regulation, thus suggesting that the Middle and Narrow Views are
inapposite. Moreover, to the extent that the deference courts show to
regulatory action is attributable in part to transaction cost problems, such
deference would appear to be out of place in the present context. As we
have seen, the federal government has had to compensate owners for
federal uses of patents since the Court of Claims Act was amended in
19 10 ,'3 and copyrights since 1960,2' without appearing to have suffered
any intolerable administrative burden.
For these reasons, the second interpretation of the case law, upholding
the continued validity of the James, Palmer, and Krupp dicta, seems
somewhat more plausible than the first. There are, nevertheless, two
substantial counterarguments to the proposition that all or most federal
interferences with the right to exclude others from one's intellectual
property constitute takings. The first is based upon the nature of
intellectual property as a nonrivalrous good, and the second upon the
undesirability of further "propertizing" the law of intellectual property.
Turning first to the argument based upon the nonrivalrous nature of
intellectual property, to refer to something as "nonrivalrous" means that
another person can use it without simultaneously depriving anyone else of

on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law,' "but that this rationale "does not apply to the relatively rare
situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses")
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)); WILL.AM A. FISCHE.L,
REGULATORYTAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICS 2-3 (1995) (similar); J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract,71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 851,937 (1996) (arguing that it is efficient not to classify as takings regulation that results in
"diffuse, de minimis diminutions in property values," but that this concern does not justify failure
to compensate when diminution in value is large and concentrated among small number of entities).
200. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978), and Pennsylvania Coal,260 U.S. at 415).
202. See id.; see also Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's IndustrialStatesAfter
Lucas, 24 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 281, 301-02 (1993).
203. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 70.
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its use.2 5 Most types of intellectual property are strongly norivalrous. °6
The government's use of a patent, trade secret, or copyright, for example,
does not prevent the intellectual property owner from simultaneously using
the work (assuming that she has the right to use it in the first place), or
from licensing others to use it; nor does the unauthorized use of a slogan
or other trademark impede the owner from continuing to affix the mark to
his products. All that the intellectual property owner loses, except in those
rare circumstances in which government use destroys virtually all of the
property's value, is some licensing revenue. By contrast, the imposition of
an easement upon real property invites the entire public to come onto the
property and use it, thus depriving the landowner (at least temporarily) of
the use and enjoyment of those portions that others are physically
occupying at any point in time, and preventing him from using the property
in any manner inconsistent with the public's use and enjoyment. 7 These
facts strongly suggest that government uses of intellectual property are not
functionally identical to the imposition of easements over real property,
and (perhaps) that they should not be subject to the same categorical
treatment as the latter.20 8

205. As Professor Madow observes,
[i]ntellectual creations are susceptible to "nonrivalrous consumption," in the sense
that their possession or use by one person does not preclude others from possessing
or using them as well. If Jones takes or borrows Smith's umbrella, neither Smith nor
anyone else can use it. But ifJones takes or borrows Smith's dog-training trick, or his
interior decorating style, or his Dan Quaylejoke, that in no way precludes Smith or
anyone else from using it. Second, intellectual creations are "nonexhaustible," in that
they can be used again and again without being used up. However many times
Smith's dog-training trick is used, it is still "there' to be used yet again. It is no less
"valuable" to me because countless others have used it before.
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: PopularCulture and Publicity Rights, 81
CAL L. REV. 127, 222 n.445 (1993).
206. See id.; see also Paul B. Thompson, Conceptions of Property and the Biotechnology
Debate(Thinking ofBiology),45 BIOSCIENCE 275 (1995) (discussing nonrivalrous nature of ideas).
A few intellectual property rights may be at least somewhat rivalrous, however. As Professor Kwall
has pointed out, for example, the value to a celebrity ofthe right to market her image under the right
of publicity depends in part upon the exclusive nature of that right; too much exposure may dilute
the value of her persona. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 108 (1994). The same
argument would apply to the right to protect one's trademark from dilution.
207. Cf Kwall, supra note 70, at 736 (stating that government uses that do not prevent
copyright owners from continuing to obtain financial benefits from their works "may be more
analogous to government regulations that diminish a property's value' than to physical invasions).
208. Moreover, as we have seen, governmental interferences with personal property may be
somewhat less likely to be construed as takings than are interferences with real property, even when
the interference deprives the owner of virtually all of the value of the personal property. See Andrus
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A second argument against the Expansive View is based upon the
concern that recognizing government uses of intellectual property as
takings further strengthens the view of intellectual property as "property,"
and that this ever-expanding "propertization" of intellectual property
disserves the public interest.2" Some scholars have argued, for example,
that as copyright rights continue to expand, the public loses out as the
scope of defenses (such as fair use) shrink, and as a public domain,
10
formerly enriched by short copyright terms, diminishes in significance.
Similar arguments can be raised concerning the expansion of trademark
rights' and the right of publicity.2 12 On this view, if the use of takings
rhetoric strengthens the perception of intellectual property as a strong form
of property right-one that admits of few if any exceptions and that can be
expanded but never scaled back-it can only hinder public access to
intellectual works.
Although I largely share the concerns voiced by critics of the ever-

v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-55, 65-67 (1979). Although Andrus involved an alleged regulatory
taking, not a physical occupation, the fact that the Court declined to find a taking even though the
regulation may have rendered the property worthless to its owner may suggest that state action with
regard to personal property is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as state action with regard
to land. And while this result may be difficult to justify other than by reference to some
metaphysical view of land as being more sacred than other forms of property, perhaps one lesson
to be drawn from Monsanto is that the Supreme Court simply is not willing to subject interferences
with personal or intangible property to the same degree of scrutiny as its does interferences with
land.
209. I am indebted to Mark Lemley for articulating this argument. See Mark A. Lemley,
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997)
(reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCrION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCiErY (1996)).
210. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyrightanda DemocraticCivil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 364-85 (1996); Written Testimony ofDennis S. Karjala, Professorof Law, Arizona State
University,Representing UnitedStatesCopyrightandIntellectualPropertyLawProfessorsBefore
House of RepresentativesComm. on the Judiciary,Subcomm. on CourtsandIntellectualProperty,
on H.R. 989, A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code with Respect to the Duration of
Copyright, and for Other Purposes <http:llwww.lawlib.uh.edulfaculty/Cloyeelkarjala.html>
(visited May 28, 1998).
211. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the NaturalLaw of IntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1583-91 (1993);
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects ofPropertyandSubjects of Politics:IntellectualPropertyLaws and
DemocraticDialogue,69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1868-76 (1991).
212. See, e.g., Coombe, supra note 211, at 1876-77; Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the
Restatement(Third)of Unfair Competition:Mixed-Use Trademarksand the Problem with Vanna,
47 S.C. L. REV. 783,803-09 (1996); Madow, supranote 205, at 135-47; butsee Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 55-57 (1997) (arguing that this "position is unsupported by any hard
evidence of societal harm"). The right of publicity is yet another unfair competition doctrine, under
which "[olne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without
consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade" can be
subject to liability. See RESTATEMENT (TH1IRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 46 (1995).
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expanding scope of intellectual property rights, it is not entirely clear that
these arguments should affect the resolution of the takings issue.
Classifying intellectual property as one form of property, after all, does not
necessarily mean that it must share all of the attributes of other forms of
property. Nothing in the arguments set forth above, for example, suggests
that there would be any constitutional infirmity in deciding (prospectively)
to scale back the copyright term, to expand the fair use privilege, or to
repeal antidilution laws. My argument is simply that, to the extent (if
any)213 that the intellectual property rights the state chooses to recognize
share the attributes of other, more traditional forms of property, the state
may effect a taking of that property when it fails to respect the borders it
has voluntarily created between "mine" and "yours." And while there may
be some risk that takings rhetoric might help to cloak intellectual property
rights with a stronger, more absolute character than is desirable, this risk
seems fairly remote in light of the fact that a taking will arise only when
the government engages in conduct which, if engaged in by nonstate actors,
would constitute an infringement.
In summary, while there are strong reasons for rejecting the Middle
View, to the extent that it relies upon a blind adherence to the regulatory
takings rubric, and the Narrow View, which appears to exclude far too
many government uses from the scope of Fifth Amendment liability, the
absence thus far of a significant body of case law attempting to negotiate
among the various strands of the doctrine means that the only government
uses one can be certain will qualify as takings are those few which deprive
the owner of virtually all of the property's value.214 Moreover, even if the
Middle and Narrow Views are rejected, it remains unclear whether
government uses of intellectual property should be viewed as resting upon
precisely the same footing as governmental occupations of land. Equating
these uses with physical invasions nevertheless is easier to justify than
equating them with use and enjoyment regulation, and in the absence of
some principled intermediate view this may be the better of two imperfect
options.
IV. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

As noted above, three further requirements that must be satisfied in
order for a state actor's conduct to implicate the Fifth Amendment are (1)
that the state interferes in some manner with "private property," (2) that the
interference be for public use, and (3) that the conduct be duly authorized

213. See infra text accompanying notes 219, 223-29 (suggesting that, while patents, trade
secrets, and copyrights share many of the attributes of more traditional forms of property, the
position of trademarks is more tenuous).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 174-83.
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by the appropriate legislative body.215 These three conditions further limit
the types of governmental conduct for which the Constitution mandates
just compensation.
A. Property
The first requirement, that the state deprive the claimant of a property
interest, arguably poses only a minimal obstacle to the classification as
takings of most government uses of patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and
trademarks that would be considered infringing if carried out in the private
sector. As we have seen, the Supreme Court in Monsanto specifically held
216
that trade secrets are a form of property subject to the Takings Clause
and strongly suggested that patents are as well in cases such as James,
Palmer,and Krupp. t7 Moreover, the factors the Court cited in Monsanto
as reasons for concluding that trade secrets are property-including the fact
that they are assignable and may form the res of a trust, as well as the
Court's prior characterization of other intangible interests such as liens and
contract rights as property-apply with equal force to copyrights 2 8' and, to
a lesser extent, to trademarks.219

215. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
216. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984).
217. See Krupp, 224 U.S. at 305-08; Palmer,128 U.S. at 270-71; James, 104 U.S. at 357-58;
see also College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
423 (D.N.J. 1996) ("'That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals
and by government, has long been settled.' ") (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386,415 (1945)), affid, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming as to unfair competition claim),
petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998)(No. 98-149), and afd, 148 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming as to patent infringement claim), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998)(No. 98-531); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Department of Transp., 626 So.
2d 1333, 1337 (Fla. 1993) (" '[a] patent is a species of property' ") (quoting Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947)).
218. Like trade secrets, copyrights are freely assignable, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994), and
may form the res of a trust, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82, cmt. c (1959);
AUSTIN W. SCOTr & WILIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 82.3 (4th ed. 1987).
219. Trademarks are assignable, though only if the owner also transfers to the assignee the
goodwill symbolized by the mark, see 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFUNFAIR
COMPETITION § 34 (1995). They may also be held in trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS
§ 82 cmt. d (1959); SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 218, § 82.4. See also United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating that "[t]here is no such thing as property
in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is employed"); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)
(stating that trademarks are property "only in the sense that a man's right to the continued
enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted
interference by others, is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an
instrumentality"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, §§ 2.14 to 2.15 (discussing property-like nature
of trademarks); 2 McCARTHY, supra,§ 18.2 (discussing rule requiring transfer ofgoodwill), § 18.7
(discussing enforceability of security interests in trademarks).
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Some types of intellectual property rights, however, are not as easily
classifiable as property under these criteria. In the law of copyright, for
example, the "moral rights" recognized by the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 are not assignable 0 and (in the case of joint works) may be waived
by one joint author on behalf of all other joint authors without the others'
consent.221 Moral rights are also often viewed as protecting a personality
interest analogous to reputation, rather than as creating a property
entitlement.2"
Some of the rights recognized under the federal law of unfair
competition are equally difficult to classify as property. Consider, for
example, the tort of trademark dilution. On the one hand, dilution is
assumed to injure the mark's selling power or commercial magnetism,223
so if the mark is property perhaps the state that engages in dilution effects
a taking of that property. The problem is that this logic threatens to turn
any governmental infringement of a federally-protected right-here, the
right to be free from dilution-into a taking of private property; and while
the Supreme Court has at times recognized property interests in
nontraditional forms of property such as government entitlements,' it has
never embraced the reductio adabsurdum of converting all federal rights
into property interests. 22

220. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (1994).
221. See id.
222. This is clearly the view in Europe, at least, where the droit moral was first recognized.
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics, andthe Droit Moral, 76 N.C.L. REV. 1, 6-15
(1997) (describing theory behind European moral rights law); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)
(according right to prevent intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of qualifying
work "which would be prejudicial to [artist's] honor or reputation"). Reputation, however, is not
considered a property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (cited in College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 1997), petitionfor cert.
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998)(No. 98-149)), and therefore presumably would not
be so viewed for purposes of the Fifth Amendment either. See also VAzquez, supra note 169, at
1745 n.281 (arguing that meaning of "property" under Fifth Amendment is narrower than meaning
under Due Process Clause).
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF UNFAIR COMPETrrlON § 25 (1995); Bohannan & Cotter,
supra note 23.
224. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (recognizing property
interest in welfare benefits).
225. Cf.Vzquez, supra note 169, at 1747-48 (noting that, under Supreme "Court's current
approach to this subject, whether a statute establishes a property right [for purposes of the Due
Process Clause] turns on whether the statute places mandatory limits on a state's discretion to act
towards the putativeproperty holder") (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
538-39 (1985)). Perhaps the limits imposed by the antidilution provisions of theLanham Act upon
one's freedom to act towards trademark owners are not sufficiently mandatory to justify property
characterization under this approach. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (stating that owner of famous
mark "shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
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Perhaps, though, a principled distinction can be made between conduct
by which the government infringes a trademark and conduct that only
causes dilution of the mark. For one thing, the right to be free from dilution
might be viewed as protecting a reputational interest22 6 and, as noted
above, under current law reputation is probably not a protectable property
interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 227 Moreover, when the
government infringes a trademark, its conduct is more like a traditional
taking in that the government has in effect appropriated to itself an interest
that generally is obtainable on the open market-a trademark license.228 On
the other hand, the interest in being free from dilution is not the type of
interest in which a market normally exists: companies generally do not sell
the right to blur or tarnish their marks, after all. When the government
commits an act of trademark dilution, then, perhaps it is better viewed as
simply committing a wrongful act, rather than as effecting a taking of
property. The same logic would suggest that the court was correct when,
in a recent case involving allegations of false advertising by a state
governmental body, it held that the right to be free from false advertising,
229
unlike a patent or copyright, is not cognizable as a property interest.

reasonable to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark... if
such use begins after mark has become famous and causes dilution," and setting forth factors to be
considered in evaluating whether mark is sufficiently famous to merit protection from dilution); id.
§ 1125(c)(4) (exempting from scope of statute fair uses of marks in comparative advertising,
noncommercial uses of marks, and news reporting and commentary). A similar argument, however,
might be raised against infringing uses of marks as well, see id. § 1116(a) (authorizing courts to
grant injunctions against infringihg uses of marks, "according to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court may deem reasonable"), as well as against infringing uses of patents, see 35
U.S.C. § 283 (using similar language to qualify courts' authorization to grant injunctions against
infringing uses of patents). Cf.17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (stating that court"may, subject to the provisions
of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright").
226. See, e.g., Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1165 (N.Y. 1977) (describing antidilution statute as protecting against "cancer-like growth of
dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established
distinctive trade-mark or name"). Of course, the right to be free from trademark infringement also
can be viewed to some extent as protecting a reputational interest, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAmCOMPETrrION § 9 cmt. c (1995) ('The protection oftrademarks thus encourages investment
in quality and service by securing to the trademark owner the benefits of a favorable reputation."),
but the mark's selling power or magnetism does not occupy as prominent a place in infringement
actions as it does in dilution actions.
227. See supra note 222.
228. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, Where It Doesn't Exist:
RethinkingTwo Doctrinesfromthe Common Law of Trademarks,1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 487,524-25
(discussing trademark licensing).
229. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d
353, 361 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that, "just because the state's actions impact on a private
business does not mean that" the right to be free from false advertising is a property interest),
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B. Public Use
By contrast, the second requirement, that the taking be for public use,
is unlikely to exclude many uses by government officials from the purview
of the Takings Clause. Given the expansive definition of "public use"
adopted in Monsanto-as being "coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers, ' 30 such that a public use will be found as long
as the taking has some "conceivable public character" 23 -it is difficult to
imagine many uses by a state officer that potentially serve the minimal
state interest necessary for them to be viewed as falling within the scope
of his employment but which would not, at the same time, possess the
"conceivable public character" necessary to be deemed "public." 232 Relief
from those infringements that do not bear any "conceivable public
character," and that therefore do not implicate the Fifth Amendment,
presumably could be obtained from the infringer personally or (possibly)
from the government on a substantive due process theory.33
C. Authorization
The final qualification, that in order to implicate the Fifth Amendment
the taking must be duly authorized by Congress, has been the subject of
conflicting interpretations. As noted above, the Supreme Court has
observed that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of uncompensated
takings "is directed against the Government, and not against individual or
public officers proceeding without the authority of legislative
enactment, ' '21 so that a deprivation not authorized "expressly or by
necessary implication.., by some act of Congress, is not the act of the
Government. ' 23" As a coauthor and I have noted in a companion article,
exactly how specific this authorization must be in order to implicate the
Fifth Amendment is a matter of some uncertainty;23 a 1984 decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
however, illustrates two different possible approaches. At issue in Ramirez

petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998)(No. 98-149). Presumably the same
would be true for the right to be free from product disparagement.
230. Monsanto 467 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
240 (1984)).
231. Id.
232. See Kwall, supra note 70, at 711-17 (noting expansive interpretation of public use

requirement).
233.
234.
235.
236.

See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 23.
Hooev. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910).
Id. at 336.
See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 23.
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de Arellano v. Weinberger37 was the legality of an alleged Department of
Defense military training facility on land which the plaintiffs owned in
Honduras.2"' The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the
Secretary of Defense and other officials, alleging that their operation of the
training center violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.239 Among the
issues presented on appeal were whether the plaintiffs had stated a takings
claim against the United States, and if so whether they should have filed
a "claim against the United States founded.., upon the Constitution" 2" in
the Court of Claims, pursuant to the Tucker Act.241
Two different readings of the case law are suggested by the majority
and dissenting opinions in Ramirez. In ruling that the plaintiffs were not
relegated to their remedies under the Tucker Act, the majority articulated
the following test:
[n]ot all illegal acts of government officials are considered
unauthorized for the purpose of determining the government's
liability to pay compensation under the Tucker Act. The
question in each case is whether the defendant's actions are
substantially in compliance with the powers granted to them
by congressional statute or constitutional provision. Recovery
under the Tucker Act has been permitted when a taking by an
officer is the natural consequence of congressionally approved
measures or the result of an exercise of discretion granted to
an official
for the implementation of a congressional
242
statute.
In dissent, then-Judge Scalia endorsed the district court's position that, if
a taking occurs while a government official "is acting within the normal
scope of his duties (a concept akin to, though not as liberal as, the 'scope
of employment' test for application of the doctrine of respondeat superior
in private law)," the claimant must pursue a takings claim in the Court of
Claims, "unless Congress has expressed a positive intent to prevent the
taking or to exclude governmental liability. 243 Under this analysis, the
relevant question is whether the officials are generally authorized to engage

237. 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane),
vacated on othergrounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
238. See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1505.
239. See id.
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994).
241. See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1522-24.
242. Id. at 1523.
243. Ramirez, 724 F.2d at 151 (footnote omitted); see Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1555 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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in the conduct at issue, with no specific limitation imposed by Congress. 24
It should be clear that, under either approach, a good many uses of
intellectual property by government officials may fall outside the purview
of the Takings Clause. To illustrate, consider the recent decision in
Freiman v. Lazur, in which a federal district court held that the United
States could be liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) when a federal employee
allegedly infringed a copyright within the scope of his employment but in
violation of federal procurement laws.245 If the same level of authorization
is necessary to render the government liable for a taking of real property
under the Tucker Act as for the use of a copyright under section 1498(b),
then under the Ramirez majority's view that conduct is attributable to the
government only if it is "the natural consequence of congressionally
approved measures or the result of an exercise of discretion granted to an
official for the implementation of a congressional statute, '' 246 the
employee's conduct in violation of federal procurement laws would not
effect a taking of private property. The same result appears to hold true
under Judge Scalia's reading of the case law, under which the government
is not responsible where Congress "has expressed a positive intent to
'
prevent the taking or to exclude governmental liability,"247
in that the
procurement laws would appear to be such an expression of intent. Cases
of this nature, in other words, involving actions by federal employees
contrary to government policy, would not give rise to takings liability, even
if the use is such that it would effect a taking if duly authorized.248
V. CONCLUSION

Referring back to the examples noted at the beginning of this article,
there are strong, though not dispositive, reasons for concluding that the
first example, involving the federal government's use of a patented

244. See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1555 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. 925 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1996). Note that, under traditional tort law doctrine, an act
committed by an employee is deemed within the scope of her employment, and is 'therefore
attributable to her employerunder the doctrine ofrespondeat superior, ifher conduct was motivated
in appreciable part to serve her employer's interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 237
cmt. b (1959). This principle holds true even when the employee's conduct is (1) contrary to the
employer's instructions, or (2) a tortious or criminal act. See id. §§ 230, 231.
246. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1523.
247. Id. at 1555 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. The counterargument to the above analysis would be that, when a government employee
acting within the scope of his employment uses a copyright or patent without consent of the owner,
the federal government ratifies his conduct by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, thus transforming the tort
into a lawful taking. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing Crozier v. Fried.
Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290 (1912)). The issue would be whether § 1498 constitutes
a ratification of all such conduct on the part of the employee, or only of conduct that is not
forbidden by federal law other than the patent and copyright laws.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 50

invention, almost always constitutes a taking for which just compensation
is due under the Fifth Amendment, as long as the use serves a minimal
public purpose and is not contrary to legislative authorization. While this
type of use, as well as analogous uses of copyrights, will also be
compensable under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, on occasion it may be important, as
in cases like De Graffenried,to be able to characterize them as takings as
well.
There is also reason to conclude that, in the example based upon
Monsanto, the Court would be correct in classifying only some of the
government conduct at issue as takings. Rather than being read as standing
for the proposition that most government uses of intellectual property do
not qualify as takings, however, Monsanto is consistent with the view that
most uses that would be infringements if committed by nonstate actors can
be classified as takings, as long as all of the other takings elements are met.
The third example, involving the use by the federal government of a
trademark, is the most difficult to resolve. Although a case can be made
that, when the government commits an act of trademark infringement it
effects a taking of a trademark license which should be remediable under
the Tucker Act, an act of trademark dilution (as well as false advertising
and product disparagement) arguably does not interfere with a protected
property interest. Even if this reasoning is incorrect, however,
characterizing an act of dilution as a taking may do little to protect the
trademark owner's interest, inasmuch as the standard remedy for takings
is just compensation.249 Given the inherent difficulty of measuring exactly
250
how much an act of dilution diminishes the value of a trademark,
recognizing dilution as a taking of private property might in any event
provide the trademark owner with little tangible protection.

249. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016.
250. See supra note 43.
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